Ramaswamy's plan, which he called the "mirror-image" of President Richard Nixon's diplomatic overture to China in 1972, aims to achieve a vital U.S. security objective by ending Russia's growing military alliance with China. He argues that a Sino-Russia alliance presents the most significant military risk the U.S. has ever faced. Russia and China outmatch the U.S. in every area of great power competition.
Ramaswamy criticizes President Joe Biden's support for Ukraine, stating that it only pushes Russia into a closer military alliance with China and increases the risk of nuclear war. He argues that the U.S. should broker a Korean War-style truce between Ukraine and Russia that codifies the current lines of control, ceding most of the Donbas region to Russia.
The agreement would suspend any further U.S. military assistance to Ukraine and put a permanent moratorium on Ukraine joining NATO. Further, the U.S. and Western NATO countries would end the Western sanctions regime against Russia, restore normal diplomatic relations with Russia with mutual security commitments, withdraw all troops from Ukraine, and close all their bases in Eastern Europe.
In return, Russia would completely exit its military alliance with China, ending the 2001 Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation and the 2022 no-limits partnership, permanently suspend all military-technical cooperation and joint military exercises with China, agree to re-enter the pre-2023 New Start nuclear non-proliferation treaty with the U.S., and withdraw all nuclear weapons and delivery capabilities from Belarus, Kaliningrad, and annexed regions of Ukraine, as well as all military forces from Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua.
Ramaswamy argues that this strategy would ensure that none of the three nuclear superpowers — the U.S., China, and Russia — are allied so that the U.S. and its allies could focus on Chinese aggression. He also argues that Putin would be amenable to a peace deal, contrary to what Russian hawks say. "Putin's apparent willingness last year to negotiate a peace agreement which addresses Russia's security concerns suggest that he is open to a deal and provides the U.S. with negotiating leverage to bring him back to the table."
Ramaswamy concludes that with China's growing military support of Russia in the war, Ukraine will not defeat Russia militarily without extraordinary U.S. intervention. Such intervention would badly deplete U.S. military resources needed for land conflict in Taiwan, which may be China's objective in backing Russia. Under his peace plan, Ukraine will still emerge with its sovereignty intact, and Russia permanently diminished as a foe. Ukraine's best way to preserve its security is to accept a U.S.-negotiated agreement backstopped by Russian commitments to the U.S.
"Opponents of U.S. engagement in Ukraine should embrace the possibility that we can accomplish more than just saving money by ending the war. We can also achieve the most vital U.S. security objective of the 21st century: deterring Chinese aggression. If elected, I will lead accordingly."